For those interested in health care reform, the word of the week is "trigger." Trying to find a compromise on the controversial public option that's politically palatable to both liberals and moderates, Sen. Olympia Snowe -- currently the only Republican interested in finding common ground with the Democrats -- has been pitching the idea. How would it work? Essentially, health care legislation would establish certain benchmarks for affordability. If private insurers could not find a way to lower premium costs for enough people in geographically distinct markets by a still-undetermined deadline, a public option would be introduced into the health insurance exchange. (The New Republic's Suzy Khimm has a good rundown here.)

On MSNBC earlier today, Illinois' own Rep. Jan Schakowsky made clear that she isn't too fond of the idea, reiterating her support for a "a robust public health insurance plan upon implementation, no triggers."

There are good reasons to be skeptical of the trigger approach. For one, to modify their behavior, insurance companies would need to feel threatened by the looming public option, something that isn't likely if the legislation envisioned by Snowe is ultimately implemented. As Ezra Klein notes today, "I've not yet seen a proposal for a trigger where the trigger is set sufficiently low and the public option it would create would be national, rather than state-by-state."

That brings us to our second problem: special interests. Robert Reich explains how insurance companies could use the grace period to blow holes through the trigger instead of working to lower costs:

First, it's impossible to design airtight goals for coverage and cost reductions that won't be picked over by 5,000 and as many lawyers and litigators even if, at the end of the grace period, it's apparent to everyone else that the goals aren't met. Washington is a vast cesspool of well-paid specialists who know how to stop anything resembling a "trigger." Believe me, they will.

If designed differently, however, the trigger option could ironically lead to a more robust public option. Before the recess, members of the House Energy and Commerce Committee stripped out a provision in their bill that would allow the public option to be based on Medicare payment rates and allow the Secretary of Health and Human Services to negotiate directly with providers to set rates. The Senate HELP Committee's bill follows the same "level-playing field" model. In other words, the best congressional Democrats might be able to get through now is a weak public plan that would be small and negligibly cheaper than other private options on an exchange.

But what if the private insurers really did fail to make changes? House Speaker Nancy Pelosi thinks her caucus would have a lot of leverage:

They'd be better getting a public option now than one that is triggered because if you have a triggered public option, it's because the insurance industry has demonstrated that they're not cooperating, they're not doing the right thing, and I think they'll have a tougher public option to deal with.

If Congressional leaders want to pursue the trigger option, they must ensure that the eventual public option is worth the wait. Otherwise, the bridge will serve no purpose other than to ease short-term pressure on insurance giants. And that's obviously not the goal of this reform effort.